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Abstract:  This study analyses bank lending in the larger context of bank-firm relations within the 
Bulgarian specificity of currency board. It focuses on the ‘intersection’ of credit supply and demand 
on the side of banks and firms simultaneously. We suggest both traditional and new hypotheses 
corresponding to the specific conditions of the Bulgarian ownership change, transitional corruption 
and other institutional and political factors. The model is based on a survey on Bulgarian banks and a 
unique database on firms. The study found that the dynamics and structure of credit is affected mainly 
by the features of the institutional environment, whereas the ‘resource’ and traditional factors became 
secondary. During the period 1998 – 2001, there is separation of the banking sector activity from the 
activity of the real sector in Bulgaria. In the new conditions of currency board, the dual sector of 
enterprises and the specific institutional environment continue their existence. Despite its disciplining 
effect the currency board by itself is not sufficiently effective to overcome the remaining ‘institutional 
obstacles, associated mainly with the inefficiency of the judicial system, corruption, state capture, 
uncertain property rights, etc. 
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I. Introduction 
   
Five years after the introduction of the Currency Board (CB) the relation ‘banks - firms’ is still in 
the centre of economic discussions. In the period 1990-1996 banks accumulated many bad loans, 
supporting ‘crony’ firms, which led to the bank crisis in 1996/1997. At the end of 2001, banks were 
accused of the opposite - their unwillingness to give credits and their tendency to invest abroad. Some 
time ago, the unprecedented increase in credit was blamed for being a cause of the loss of financial 
stability (OECD, 1999). At the end of 2001, the low credit activity of banks was conceived as one of the 
essential obstacles to economic growth (Feyzioglu and Gelos, 2001).  
  Usually the discussion in Bulgaria is focused on the question whether the credit is supply-
restricted or demand-restricted. Traditionally, the dynamics of credit is associated with the stability of the 
currency board. It is assumed that over-lending constitutes a danger to every fixed-rate regime since at 
certain trajectories of demand for money, of the balance of payments, and of domestic credit, it is possible 
to have reduced foreign reserves, and consecutively an attack on the fixed rate. 
The banks-firms relations have other aspects apart from bank lending. However, the credit market 
model allows incorporating the new vector of variables apart from the ones used traditionally. The credit 
market model, where there is a logical linking of credit supply with the bank system, and of credit 
demand with firms, is very operational and gives the opportunity to extend it depending on the specific 
characteristics of the country studied. We see the novelty of this paper in the construction of a cross 
sectional  model, based on both bank and firm empirical data base, and including a set of variables 
reflecting not only traditional factors, but also a large range of new ones – institutional and political 
factors, factors linked to CB regime, corruption, ownership and control etc. This helps us to investigate 
and to check our theoretical hypothesis about the link between the different factors in the large context of 
Bulgarian transition. The key objective of this study is to explain the credit shrinkage after the 
introduction of the CB. The following specific tasks of the article should be highlighted: (ii) examining 
the role of traditional factors on bank and firm activity; (ii) analysing the effect of the CB, and generally 
larger institutional and political factors on the bank-firm relations; (iii) examining the common influence 
of the corporate governance structures, and the corruption environment on the bank-firm relations.  
This study has applied an original methodology. It comprises: (i) a survey of all Bulgarian banks 
in the first half of 2002 and (ii) a survey and data base of the largest non-financial firms in Bulgaria This 
allows us to ‘intersect’ the factors determining the supply and demand of credit both by the banks and the 
firms. 
  The paper has the following structure. The second section presents briefly the evolution of the 
bank-firm relations in Bulgaria for 1990 - 2001. In the third section, we make a short synopsis of the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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literature on the models of credit, present the basic theoretical hypotheses, as well as the cross sectional 
model of the credit supply and demand. The fourth section presents the data and discusses the 
methodology. The fifth section presents the statistic and econometric results of the data analysis. Finally, 
in the conclusion, we summarize the theoretical results of the study, and outline the possible perspectives 
for further research.  
  
II. The banks-firms credit relations: some background information 
 
  The evolution of the ‘bank-firm’ relations in Bulgaria in the period 1990 - 2001 bears both the 
stamp of the past of a planned economy and some specific features of the transition. Two periods are 
clearly outlined even at the first glance - before the introduction of the CB (1990-1996) and after it (1997 
- 2001)
1. 
 During  the  first period (1990 - 1996) the dynamics of the demand and supply of credit matched 
the general framework of weak financial micro and macroeconomic discipline. This dynamics were 
subject to the logic of accumulation of loss in the firms (which were transferred to the banks) or 
accumulation of loss directly in the banks. However, in both cases, the interference of the government and 
the central bank was expected, which increased the moral hazard and in different ways alleviated and 
monetarized the losses. To a great extent this process (which had a certain cyclic recurrence) could be 
accounted for by: (i) the fast growth of the banks (especially giving independence to the branches of the 
former monobank) and the lack of relevant bank regulations and bank supervision. The arrival of foreign 
banks at the Bulgarian market was purposefully limited;  (ii) the fast process of corporatization and delay 
of privatisation of the state sector, the establishment of private firms de novo with political ‘connections’; 
(iii) lack of a country corporate governance system development (inadequate legal system protecting 
investors and creditors, a low degree of law enforcement, etc.); (iv) the different schemes and 
mechanisms for decapitalization and ‘assets stripping’ of the state-owned firms and banks. 
In the period 1990 - 1996 both the size and the structure of the credit entirely reflected 
the enumerated factors. The domestic credit, correlated to the GDP reached unprecedented levels 
for the economies in transition (figure 1). The domination of claims on the public sector (over 
the credit for the private sector and particularly for households) was another specific feature. 
                                                 
1 For details about the Bulgarian transition and the crisis of 1996/1997, see Berlemann and al. (2002) and Vutcheva 
(2001). For the functioning of the CB, see Nenovsky and Hristov (2002). Caporale and al. (2002), Miller and 
Petranov (2001) give a thorough analysis of the financial system in Bulgaria. 
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Figure 1. Domestic credit (as % of GDP) 
Source: BNB 
  
The gradual accumulation of losses, of bad credits and their monetization quite naturally led to a 
crisis in 1996/1997, when part of the bank system went bankrupt, the national money lost its basic 
functions and a Currency Board was introduced.  
The new monetary regime (CB), introduced in the mid of 1997 could be viewed as a systematic 
hard budget restriction on the top of the financial system. Its basic function, which in no case is 
automatically provided, is the creation of conditions for the spreading of the restrictions down the whole 
chain, getting to every agent. Due to the lack of discretion in the CB, its start was accompanied by the 
building of a new modern system of bank supervision with the requirements for capital adequacy and 
liquidity going up higher than the internationally accepted norms (total capital adequacy ratio should not 
be lower than 12% and the primary capital adequacy should not be lower than 6%). The reserve required 
ratios were fixed at high levels (initially at 11%, later at 8%). The function of the lender of last resort is 
strictly limited to the presence of a systemic risk. Thus, the very monetary regime, the new bank 
regulations, and the improvement of the legal liquidity procedures created a new institutional and legal 
framework for the functioning of banks and firms. 
  The four years long CB (July 1997 - 2001) led to significant macroeconomic changes and to 
meaningful change in the size and structure of credit (see Table 1). As a whole the credit shrank. The 
claims on the public sector were almost indiscernible in the structure of the whole credit. The credit for 
the private sector at the end of 2001 was still at a low level. At the end of 2001, 75% of the bank capital 
was in foreign hands. Banks were overcapitalised, far beyond the regulations, bad loans were 
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regimes) the dynamics of bank assets abroad is anti-cyclical (see Barajas and Steiner, 2001). It is possible 
that this anti-cyclical behaviour of the foreign positions of commercial banks should be related to the 
traditional presence of foreign banks in the countries with a CB.  
 
Table 1. The performance of Bulgarian economy  (1997 – 2001) 
 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
GDP real growth (%)  -7  3.5  2.4  5.8  5 
Unemployment rate (%)  13.7  12.2  16  17.9  17.3 
Inflation  (%,  eop)  578.5  1.0 6.2 11.3  4.8 
Budget deficit (% of GDP)  -3  1  -1  -1.1  -1.5 
Current account (% of GDP)  10.1  -0.5  -5.0  -5.6  -6.2 
Foreign direct investment (% of  GDP)  4.9 4.2 6.3 7.9 5.1 
Foreign reserves (billions USD)  2474.1 3051.1 3221.6 3460.3 3580.3 
Number of banks (foreign banks)  34(14)  34 (17)  34 (22)  34 (24)  35 (25) 
Total capital adequacy (%)  28.9  37  41.3  35.5  31.32 
ROA (ROE) (%)   5 (116)  2 (22)  2 (21)  3 (23)  3 (19) 
Domestic credit (% of GDP)  29.5  18.9  17.8  17.4  18.5 
Credit on private sector (% of total credit)  35.6  38.9  55.8  67.2  66.5 
Credit to public sector (% of total credit)  64.4  61.1  44.2  32.8  33.5 
Standard exposures (% of total exposure)  58.2  69  73.3  82.7  92.3 
Broad money (% of GDP)  25.5  28.2  28.3  32.2  36.9 
Foreign currency deposits (% of total 
deposits) 
63.5 54.1 52.9 52.7 51.7 
     Source: BNB, NSI, author’s calculations 
 
  The credit demand is another factor explaining domestic credit movement. Since 1996 the 
changes of property-rights structures and corporate governance have been some of the basic features of 
the enterprise sector transformation. Since 1996 there has been acceleration of the privatisation process. 
The basic forms applied were a Czech-like voucher privatisation (named in Bulgaria ‘mass privatisation’) 
and management-employee buy-outs (MEBO). In 2001, about 80 % of the state assets subject to 
privatisation were privatised. The private sector (privatised and newly established private firms) 
accounted for about 70% of the value added in the Bulgarian economy. A significant characteristic of the 
emerging enterprise sector is its duality - the existence of firms with market orientation and firms 
established with specific financing by state sources and predominantly rent-seeking behaviour (Peev et al, 
1999). The key bearers of the so-called ‘corruption’ in the enterprise sector are the firms with specific 
‘connections’, which capture the state. State capture is defined as the specific capacity of firms (captor 
firms) to shape and affect the formation of the basic rules of the game (i.e. laws, regulations, decrees, etc.) 
through private payments to public officials and politicians (Hellman et al, 2000). 
In the field of country corporate governance structure since the start of the accession negotiations 
with the EU in 2000, Bulgaria has significantly reformed and aligned its commercial legislation with the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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European Community legal framework. Recent surveys reveal that the Bulgarian commercial laws have 
been improved consistently and can be characterized as reasonably good for supporting investment and 
other commercial activities (see EBRD, 2001). This has led to increased public confidence in the rule of 
law. The commercial law of Bulgaria is perceived as being at the same level as that of other transitional 
countries. However, the legal reform introduced is merely a necessary condition for corporate governance 
development but not a sufficient one and there still exists a gap between law development and law 
implementation and enforcement.  
The development of country external capital market determines financial constraints to firm 
investment performance regardless of the efficiency of ownership and governance structures (Gugler and 
al., 2002). In Bulgaria, after 1997 basic institutions to regulate the market were established and new law 
on public offering of securities came into effect. However, for the time being the Bulgarian capital market 
is fragile in comparison with the securities markets developments in other post-communist countries. The 
total market capitalization of all the listed companies amounted to about 5% of GDP in 2001. Despite the 
regulatory framework establishment, striking traits of the Bulgarian securities market are low credibility 
of the market, low liquidity, lack of efficient governance mechanisms.  
The lack of development of the equity market turns bank finance into a basic source of 
investments for enterprises. The policy of stimulating a high saving rate and financing business expansion 
could have been a foremost task. However, the real availability of the external finance in the Bulgarian 
transition in the 1990s was decreasing. The gross savings and gross fixed capital formation as a share of 
GDP declined in the 1990s and reached 12.8%, respectively 17.8%, in 2001. The domestic credit sharply 
fell from 119% in 1991, and 115% in 1996 to 18.5 % of GDP in 2001. The availability of the external 
finance is perceived by Bulgarian firms as a key issue for their development. In the BEEP survey by the 
World Bank and EBRD in Bulgaria in 1999, over 52 % of  the firms considered that insufficient external 
financing was a major obstacle to their growth (Hellman et al, 2000). In the 2000 Report of the Agency 
for SMEs in Bulgaria, over 61,8% of the dynamic SMEs considered the lack of financing a key problem 
to innovation activities and technological development. In another survey, carried out for the Annual 
Report on the Competitiveness of the Bulgarian Economy in 2001, 85% of the firms declared that the 
financial markets in Bulgaria were at a low level of development and according to 84% of the 
respondents, it was difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a loan by presenting a good business plan. 
 
III. Theoretical Base of The Study 
 
1.  A brief outline of the traditional models 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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Two new important perspectives can be outlined in the studies of credit (as a focus of the bank-
firm relations) in the last twenty years. The first perspective is largely microeconomic and is related to 
asymmetric information, transaction costs and agency problems of external capital markets, and the whole 
range of microeconomic relations between banks and firms. It is supposed that there exists a hierarchy of 
finance and the investment decisions of the firm are not independent of the way of their financing because 
outside and inside financing are not substitutes for each other (Fazzari et all, 1988).  
The second perspective, closely related to the first, is macroeconomic, in a connection with the 
so-called credit channel of monetary policy. Following its logic, it is suggested that in the conditions of 
asymmetric information on the financial markets, the supply of credit by commercial banks is an 
important transmission mechanism by which the monetary policy exercises an influence on investments 
and growth. 
There are many studies using the disequilibrium credit models: Barajas and Steiner (2001) and 
Agenor and al. (2000) for the whole of Latin America, Catao (1997), Braun and Levy-Yeyati (2000) and 
Canonero (1997) for Argentina, Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) for Asia, Gourinchas and al. (2001) for Latin 
America and the world, Pazarbasioglu (1997) for Finland. An outline of these models was made by 
Barajas and Steiner (2001). The studies mentioned above use time series model and rarely panel models. 
The European Central Bank also carried out numerous empirical credit analyses both of the whole 
zone and the separate countries. The work of Loupias and al. (2001), Mojon and Peersman (2001), 
Worms (2001), Kaufman (2001), De Haan (2001), Hernando and Martinez-Pages (2001), Topi and 
Vilmunen (2001) analyze different aspects of the credit market in differents countries in the Eurozone 
with the aim to register the asymmetry of the monetary policy of the ECB. The study of Calza and al. 
(2001) is focused on defining the factors influencing the credit demand and modelling this demand in the 
frame of the Euro zone as a whole. 
The basic limitation in almost all models quoted comes, to a certain degree, from the usage of 
traditional “ mechanical” factors when modelling the credit demand and supply, like bank lending 
capacity, interest rates, income etc. It is doubtless that the above type of modelling cannot reflect the 
whole range of relations between banks and firms, especially in a transition economy, characterized by 
significant changes in the institutional environment.  
The studies of credit in transition economies are mostly concerned with the attempts at theoretical 
explanation and empirical measurement of soft budget constraints (SBC).
2  In the same line are several 
empirical studies of credit in Bulgaria. They present analysis either only of banks or only of firms. In a 
                                                 
2 A review of the literature about the soft-budget constraints was made by Maskin and Xu (2001) and Vahabi, M. 
(2001). See also Li (1992), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), Berglof and Roland (1998). 
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panel study of firms in Bulgaria and Romania for the period 1995 - 1999, Everaert and Hildebrandt (2001) 
include bank finance when measuring the SBC of firms. In one of the models the authors associate SBC 
with ‘soft bank credit’, which is then approximated with bad loans. They discover that SBC can be 
described by the index of such variables as: the firm ownership structure (there are six types of 
ownership), the progress of the bank reform, credit market competition, and the effect of the bank crisis. 
Dobrinsky and al. (2002) presented a model of the supply of credit by commercial banks and the demand 
of soft loans by firms for the period 1994 - 1999, based on the data from balance sheets of firms.
3  The 
financial restrictions of firms and the level of interest rates are included in the model of small and 
medium-sized enterprises in Bulgaria and Russia described by Pissarides and al. (2000). 
There are several studies of credit from the bank perspective. Fezyioglu and Gelos (2001) try to 
answer the question: why after the introduction of the CB the private credit in Bulgaria is so low? They 
find the answer in some traditional factors and in some new ones such as the bank crisis, the inefficient 
institutional and legal framework (especially the lack of law adoption), and competition in the financial 
mediation etc. The authors build (and measure econometrically) the productive function in the bank 
system, concluding that the Bulgarian bank system has an oligopoly structure. 
A study close to our conception was carried out by Koford and Tschoegl (1999). They studied the 
bank practice and crediting in Bulgaria before the crisis of 1997 on the basis of interviews with bank 
managers. They detected widely spread transition practices like inside crediting, interest groups influence, 
vague legal environment, corruption, etc. Recently Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2003) stressed the specific 
features of credit activity in their model of extreme monetary regime change in 1996/1997. 
In the line of the credit channel are two studies by Nenovsky and Hristov (1998) and Nenovsky 
and al. (2001). The first one empirically tests the presence of a specific credit channel in the conditions of 
the CB. The changes in the deposit of the government in the liabilities of the Issue Department have an 
effect on the dynamics of the size and structure of the domestic credit. The second one goes further and 
finds out the presence of liquidity effect. This effect is realized through changes in the deposit of the 
government, which influences the reserves of the banks and the reserve money. 
In spite of some new moments in the latter studies, they lack two basic aspects: (i) analyzing 
credit in the larger institutional context of bank-firm relations, with the specificity of the Bulgarian 
situation and (ii) the ‘intersection’ of demand and supply of credit on the side of banks and firms 
simultaneously. Our model tries to overcome these two weaknesses. 
                                                 
3 Some of the variables employed in the model are: from the supply side - firm profit, investment expenditure, firm 
size, firm discipline, firm ownership (four categories are highlighted); from the demand side - income and turnover 
of the firm, investments, profit, liquidity, firm ownership. 
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2. Some hypotheses and research model 
 
The logic of our approach is the following. The demand and supply of credit focus in themselves, 
to a large extent, the whole scope of bank-firm relations, which, on their part, reflect the social and 
economic environment. The basic groups of factors (without our being able to completely discern them) 
are: (i) traditional factors (bank resource capacity, firm size, firm profit, etc.), which also include internal 
rules, and the organizational bank/firm structure, (ii) institutional and legal framework, mostly the CB 
restrictions and the bank, (iii) corruption, state capture and political influence, and (iv) ownership 
structure, bank control, and firm control. 
Concerning credit demand (L
ED) by firms, the hypotheses are the following: 
Attracting strategic investors, establishing majority control, having long-term interests in the 
firms after their privatization, is considered an efficient ownership transfer. It could be expected that this 
type of new private owner would have a high reputational capital and credibility in bank-firm 
relationships. 
Hypothesis 1. Firms with strategic majority owners after privatization would have higher access 
to bank credit.  
The search of external financing depends on how active the firm is, more specifically on the 
increase in business projects. The quality of business projects and the financial viability of the firm is 
another factor, determining the potential for acquiring a bank credit. The third significant factor for bank 
credit is the current financial debts of the firm, which limit the opportunities for additional debt finance. 
Thus, in general:     
Hypothesis 2. There would be a positive relationship between the increase in business projects 
(company activity) and bank credit. 
Hypothesis 3. There would be a positive relationship between efficient business projects 
(company profitability) and bank credit.  
Hypothesis 4. There would be a negative relationship between financial constraints (company 
leverage) and bank credit.  
Practice in Bulgaria and other countries shows that there is asymmetry between crediting small 
and large companies. According to the evaluation of the experts we interviewed, there is competition 
among banks in Bulgaria in attracting large credit-receivers.  
Hypothesis 5. There would be a positive relationship between company size and bank credit. 
A peculiarity of the business environment in the Bulgarian transition is the emergence of a dual 
enterprise sector and asymmetry in the relations between the state institutions and the private sector. 
There are firms closely connected to political circles and interest groups, having a privileged position in William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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society at public procurement, access to external funds (e.g. EU funds), etc. It could be inferred that these 
firms maintain their own specific relations with banks both after bank privatization and in the conditions 
of the CB.  
Hypothesis 6. There would be a positive relationship between affiliation to business groups and 
bank credit. 
Another particularity of the enterprise sector in Bulgaria is ownership heterogeneity. There exist 
specific  transitional structures of ownership after the enterprise privatisation, generating inefficient 
managerial discretion, and creating conditions for a secondary privatisation and ownership of holdings, 
firms privatised through MEBO, offshore companies, etc.). The emergence of ‘transitional’ ownership 
structures based on the state ownership transformation is a significant feature of the Bulgarian transition. 
We test for differences in debt finance for these firms and the other firms. 
This way of formulating the hypotheses allows us to present the variables and the model like this: 
The extended function of demand for credit (L
ED) by firms is: 
(1)  L
ЕD = L
ЕD (X1, X 2, X3, X4, X5, X6, ε1) 
Where the variables are: 
X1 – vector for ownership structures of the firms 
X2 – vector for firm activity 
X3 – vector for firm profitability 
X4 – vector for firm leverage 
X5 – vector for firm size 
X6 – vector for state capture, corruption and political influence 
ε1 – unaccounted factors for credit demand 
Hypotheses about credit supply (L
BS) by banks are as follows. 
Hypothesis 1.  After the CB introduction, within the framework of the traditional factors, the 
internal rules of crediting become dominant, as well as the requirements before the firms. The resource 
characteristics related mostly to bank lending capacity, are not determinant. It is not so much the capacity 
to lend, but the willingness to lend that dominates decision-making at crediting. 
Hypothesis 2. The institutional and legal environment acquired crucial importance at the decision 
of crediting, especially after the crisis in 1996/1997. The more stable, predictable, and simplified this 
environment is, the more credits are likely to be lent, especially in the private sector. The tighter legal 
regulations and their better adoption lead to a better and healthier structure of credit (directed at more 
efficient and less risk-taking investment projects). It could be assumed that within the framework of the 
general environment, the greater competition among banks leads to increase in credit (especially for the 
private sector). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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Hypothesis 3. Regarding CB effects, there is a direct connection between the CB (monetary 
regime) and the credit development. The empirical survey could answer the question whether and to what 
extent the CB acts restrictively on credit and what the type of restriction is. It can be inferred that after the 
introduction of the CB, banks are liable to lend more credits to the private sector after serious examination 
of investment projects. As we stated above, before the introduction of the CB the structure of credit was 
dominated by the public sector (the basic part of credits was ‘political’ and ‘forced’), which was one of 
the reasons for the accumulation of big losses in the bank sector. Because of the deep bank crisis in 
1996/1997, banks now are much more conservative when lending credits.  
Hypothesis 4. There is a direct connection between hypothesis 3 and the supposition that the CB 
decreased (and changed the forms of) corruption and inside lending. The CB itself as a mechanism, as 
well as the accompanying regulations, created a more “strict” environment for the bank-firm 
relationships. The CB changed substantially the conditions for refinance of the commercial banks by the 
Central Bank, therefore it changed the banks-firms ‘crony’ relations.  
Hypothesis 5. Bank ownership and bank corporate governance are particularly important when 
analysing credit. We can assume that bank ownership concentration is associated with higher bank 
profitability, and with higher bank lending activities.  
Hypothesis 6. We will test for systematic effect on credit of different firm ownership structures by 
type of owner: state, foreign, etc. On the basis of the predominant foreign bank participation on the 
Bulgarian credit market, it could be supposed that there is а positive relation between firm ownership by 
foreign investors and debt finance. It could also be supposed that close bank-firm relations in board of 
directors’ structures influence debt finance. 
The extended function of credit supply (L
BS) by banks is:  
(2) L
BS = L
BS ( Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4, Y5, Y6, ε2) 
where variables are as follows: 
Y1 – vector for traditional factors, including organizational one 
Y2 – vector for general institutional and legal framework 
Y3 – vector for factors related to CB and banking crisis 
Y4 – vector for corruption, political influence and state capture 
Y5 – vector for ownership and control (banks) 
Y6 – vector for ownership and control (firms) 
ε2 – unaccounted factors for credit supply William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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IV. Description of data and methodology 
 
To make the above formalization of credit demand and supply operational, we have to transform 
it into an econometric form, where the theoretical variables are approximated with concrete data (original 
and constructed). The suggested empirical models of credit-demand differ from those of credit-supply 
mostly in the way data is constructed. Whereas when processing credit-demand (on the part of firms) we 
use statistic database, when analysing credit-supply we combine both “objective” statistic data from 
balance sheets of banks and the “subjective” evaluations in a survey. This approach is justifiable. First, 
our task in the article is formulated quite generally – to detect the factors that determine the dynamism of 
demand and supply, but not so much the strength of these factors. Second, especially in the case of credit-
supply, there is a very strong argument in favour of the combination of the two data sources. It is the fact 
that credit lending is a direct result of the decision-making of people whose subjective evaluation is in the 
scope of our questionnaire. 
1. Data on firms 
We have collected a unique database on the 118 largest Bulgarian firms listed on the Bulgarian 
Stock Exchange (BSE). The sample period for the data is from 1998 through 2001. This data set contains: 
accounting data  (balance sheets, income statements), ownership and control structures information, data 
on firms-government relations (tax payments, security payments), affiliation to interest groups, other data 
(board of directors, etc.).  
The basic variables that are included in the groups of factors mentioned above are the following: 
L
ED – average for 1998-2001 of three indicators: total bank credit to assets, long-term bank credit 
to assets, and short-term bank credit to assets.  
X1 – ownership structures is measured by different indicators. Ownership concentration is 
measured by the percentage of shares of the largest shareholder. Ownership structures stability over the 
period 1998-2001 is measured by a dummy variable that is 1 if there is no change of company ownership 
structure in 1998-2001. Strategic investors presence is measured by a dummy variable that is 1 if there is 
no change of company ownership structure in 1998-2001 and there is company private majority control in 
2001. 
X2 – company activity is measure by the average of changes in year-to-year sales over the period 
1998-2001,  
X3 – company profitability is measured by the ratio of net income to total assets 
X4 – company capital structure is measured by company leverage defined as the ratio of debt to 
equity. 
X5 – firm size is measured by a natural logarithm of total assets. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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X6 – ownership structures of firms with ‘connections’ and ‘transitional’ ownership structures are 
measured by different indicators. Firms affiliated to business groups are determined as crony firms by a 
dummy variable that is 1 if owner is affiliated to interest groups
4. We also include a dummy variable to 
capture ownership structures with offshore companies that is 1 if the firm has any offshore owner and 
when the largest owner is an offshore company, and a dummy variable for ‘transitional’ ownership 
structures pulling crony firms, offshore firms and MEBO firms. MEBO is defined as a company whose 
largest shareholder is a firm established by MEBO privatization scheme and owned by managers and 
employees.   
 
2. Data on banks 
The main source of information about the bank system was a questionnaire survey of all 35 
commercial banks in Bulgaria, realized in the early 2002 and covered the period for the end of 2001. The 
questionnaires were sent through the Bulgarian National Bank and the International Banking Institute. 
The rest of data was taken from the balance sheets and income statements of the commercial banks (BNB 
statistics). Bank lending capacity was constructed as the sum total of the acquired bank system resources 
(plus the undistributed profit and the equity capital) minus the minimal compulsory reserves, and the bank 
notes and coins in the cash registers of commercial banks. Credit data was taken from the questionnaires 
and corrected after being compared with the bank balance sheet data. An index was constructed about the 
fluctuation (volatility) of bank excess reserves as a proxy for the CB ”restrictiveness”. In some case, there 
were formed composite indexes, uniting several answers from the questionnaires. Such is the case with 
the index, uniting the evaluations of the institutional and legal environment. 
The basic variables that enter the separate groups of factors are: 
L
BS – firms credits as a share of the total bank credit, Credits as a share of total assets, Public 
credits, Private credits and Private credits as a share of total assets. 
Y1 – bank lending capacity, factors determining decision making about refusal to lend credit 
(firm feasibility and liquidity, firm management quality, provision, project quality, finance transparency), 
long-term bank-firm relations, credit-lending internal rules efficiency, bank credit strategies. We 
constructed a general index of the answers about the factors which banks consider major ones for the 
quality of the projects. 
Y2 – judgments on the state of the institutional and legal environment (such as requirements for 
capital adequacy and credit provision, required reserves, deposit guarantee system), judgments about the 
                                                 
4 As a proxy for affiliation to business groups we use the affiliation to the Business Club ‘Vazrazdane’, organization 
of the big business in Bulgaria whose members have belonged to communist-capitalist ‘web’ established since the 
beginning of transition in 1989.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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degree of competition among banks (when attracting resources and credit lending), judgments about the 
tax environment and regulations, judgements about legal protection, about owner’s right protection, 
judgements about the functioning of the law system, about the dependence of the law system on political 
pressure, judgements about the state of the infrastructure. There is a synthetic index built on the 
judgments given by banks about the general state of the institutional environment, including bank 
legislature, the legal environment as a whole, court procedures, and political factors. 
Y3 – this group of factors are closely interwoven with Y2. Apart from the some of the variables 
in Y2, the effect of the CB on crediting can be assessed by direct bank evaluations and some quantitative 
proxy of CB (fluctuations of the bank excess reserves, exchange rate
5, inflation). Besides these, here 
belong the investment motivation abroad, the impact of the 1996/1997 crisis, the probable adoption of the 
euro, etc. 
Y4 –  judgements about the non-economic considerations at credit lending, corruption, the 
organized crime, the efficiency of the legal system in fighting corruption, and the corruption in the very 
legal system, the bank pressure at changes in the legal system, etc. 
Y5 – variables for the type of the largest bank shareholder  (national or foreign, a physical person, 
a corporate body, a non-bank firm or a bank), as well as for the percentage of equity held by the largest 
shareholder 
Y6 – judgments about the relationships between banks and firms, about the influence of banks on 
firms (on managers, information about the firm, participation of the bank in firms’ boards of directors), 
about inclinations to lend credits depending on the type of firm ownership (state, public on the stock 
exchange, Bulgarian private, Bulgarian privatized, foreign private, foreign privatized), the attitude of 
banks to the type of connection “bank-firm” (a basic partner or competitive partner), the influence of bank 
representatives on firms’ boards of directors, opinions about the stability of the bank system if banks are 
allowed to possess shares in firms, etc.  
 
V. Empirical results 
 
The large number of variables, explicating the dynamics of credit at a restricted number of 
observations, does not allow us to test a general model of the demand and supply of credit, encompassing 
all factors. This results from the loss of degrees of freedom. Therefore, we proceed in the following way. 
First, we give the tables of correlations of the dependent variable with the basic factors. Hence, we can 
judge about the type of relation, positive, negative, or none. Second, in other tables, we show part of the 
                                                 
5 It is often claimed that the characteristics of the exchange rate (nominal and real), as a basic feature of the CB, is 
an obstacle (or a stimulus) for lending. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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regressions (a result of table processing), which have the best technical characteristics. Consequently, we 
have four tables, two of credit demand (tables 2 and 3), and two of credit supply (tables 4 and 5) 
6. 
 
Credit demand  
 
The results confirm the hypothesis that the presence of a strategic private investor has a positive 
effect on bank credit access. The stability of company ownership structure during the period 1998 – 2001 
also has a positive relationship with bank lending. 
The increase in firm activity, however, is negatively correlated to the bank crediting of firms. 
This could be explained by the conservative policy of banks after the introduction of the currency board. 




Table 2. Credit demand (correlations) 
 
       
X/L
ED Total  Credit  Long-term  credit Short-term  credit 
X1  (+) Stable ownership*  (-) Share of largest shareholder*  (+) Stable ownership* 
  (+) Private majority largest owner**    (+) Private majority largest owner** 
      (+) Share of largest shareholder ** 
X2   (-)  Sales  growth*   
X5  (+) Size (total assets)**    (+) Size (total assets)*** 
X6  (+) Offshore owners**  (+) Crony firms**  (+) Offshore owners** 
  (+) Big debtors*  (+) Offshore largest owner**   
    (+) Transitional owners**   
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
                                                 












ED  Total Credit  Total Credit  Long Credit Long  Credit  Short  Credit 
Coef.  {-0.775} {-1.175} {-2.053} {2.135}  {-1.934} 
X1  Share of largest shareholder      [(0.164),(1.862)]* 
  Stable ownership   [(0.162),(1.686)]*     
  Majority largest owner       
  Private majority largest owner  [(0.225),(2.587)]**       [(0.147),(1.670)]* 
X2  Average Growth     [(-0.156),(-1.784)]*   
X5  Size  [(0.149),(1.707)]* [(0.195),(2.025)]**  [(0.241),(2.649)]***   [(0.194),(2.193)]** 
X6  Offshore largest owner    [(0.301),(3.308)]*** [(0.339),(3.880)]***  
  Offshore owners  [(0.247),(2.831)]*** [(0.261),(2.830)]***   [(0.175),(1.981)]** 
  R2  0.147 0.159 0.156 0.138 0.131 
  Adj  R2  0.124 0.134 0.140 0.123 0.1 
 Std.err.  8.380E-02 7.373E-02 2.199E-02 4.441E-02 7.361E-02 
  ANOVA  F  6.469 6.344 9.443 9.028 4.247 
{t-statistics} 
[(st.coef.B),(t-stat)] 
***  Significant at 0.01 level 
**  Significant at 0.05 level 
*  Significant at 0.10 level William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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  The study shows that there is no direct relation between company profitability and bank 
crediting. There was no connection established between the financial health of enterprises (measured 
by company leverage) and the bank lending. These results confirm the observations above about the 
severing of the relation between bank finance and company performance in the Bulgarian economy in 
1998-2001. 
Further, the results confirm the hypothesis that large firms have a wider range of access to 
credit. The other hypothesis that the firms affiliated to business groups would have a larger access to 
bank credits is also confirmed. This means that in spite of the introduction of the currency board, 
these firms find a specific way of accessing bank crediting. 
  Firms with an offshore owner also have higher bank crediting. We could assume that this is 
connected with potential capital flight of these companies. However, this assumption should be a 
subject of further research. 
  In short, not only strategic private investors and stable owners have access to bank credits, but 
also offshore owners with a dubious origin of capital, and firms known for their political connections. 
These results show that the emerging dual enterprise sector has continued its existence since currency 




In general, the results confirm our theoretical hypotheses. The traditional positive link of bank 
lending capacity with credit is negative here, i.e. the increase in bank resources leads to decrease in 
credit. A positive correlation is traced only in private credits as part of the total assets of banks. This 
indicates that not so much the resources, but the willingness to lend credits are decisive in the 
dynamism of credit as a whole. This result fits the behaviour of banks (at least till the end of 2001) of 
investing their resources from abroad. It seems that only private credit, (considered more effective) is 
more closely related to the dynamism of available resources.   
Everywhere there is positive correlation between the good quality of projects on the side of 
firms, the efficiency of internal rules of banks and the growth of credit. The results indicate that the 
state of the institutional and legal environment, as well as the tax and regulatory environment, are still 
an obstacle to credit. There is a negative correlation between the evaluation of their state and the 
dynamics of credits. The same negative signs appear in the efficiency of the legal system, as well as in 
the property rights protection. The CB (directly through the index of the institutional environment) 
and approximated with the exchange rate and inflation has a positive influence upon credit activities. 
This shows that by itself the CB is not an obstacle, on the contrary the rest of the environment is an 
obstacle to credit. Corruption, non-economic considerations, and organized crime are also obstacles to 
credit. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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Firms credits  
as a share of total credit  
Credits  









(-) Bank lending capacity*** 
(+) Low firm profits and liquidity 
was a decisive factor to not approve a 
credit**(a) 
(+) Management quality was a 
decisive factor to not approve a 
credit* (a) 
(+) Low quality
7 of proposed firm 
projects was a decisive factor not to 
approve a credit** 
(-) Bank lending capacity* 
(+)Management quality was a decisive factor 
to not approve a credit *** (а) 
(+) Lack of adequate collateral was a decisive 
factor to not approve a credit** (а) 
(+) Inflation was a serious obstacle for bank’s 
activity* (d)  
(+)Low quality of proposed firm projects was 
a decisive factor not to approve a credit *** 
 (+) Effectiveness of the internal 
rules for payment and career 
schemes for credit decision 
makers based on bank 
performance* (b) 
(+)Low quality of proposed firm 
projects was a decisive factor not 
to approve a credit * 
(+) Bank lending 
capacity** 
(-) Bank lending capacity* 
(+)Management quality was 
a decisive factor to not 
approve a credit ** (a) 
(+)Low quality of proposed 
firm projects was a decisive 




  (-) Taxes and regulations were serious 
obstacles for bank’s activity*** (d) 
(-) Infrastructure was a serious  obstacle for 
bank's activity** (d)  
(-) Banking regulations are effective** (c) 
(-) Legal system protects contractual and 
property rights in business disputes** (c) 
(-) Synthetic index
8 for institutional and legal 
environment*** 
 (-)  Banking 
regulations are 
effective * (c)  
(-) Synthetic index 
for institutional and 
legal environment 
* 
(-) Taxes and regulations 
were serious obstacles for 
bank’s activity ** (d) 
(-) Infrastructure was a 
serious  obstacle for bank's 
activity * (d) 
(-)Banking regulations are 
effective ** (c)  
(-)Legal system protects 
contractual and property 
rights in business disputes 
** (c) 
(-) Synthetic index for 




  (+) Exchange rate is a serious obstacle for 
bank’s activity* (d) 
      
Y4 
 
  (-) Bank typically influences new laws and 
regulations* (f) 
(-) Corruption is a serious 
obstacle for bank’s activity** (d) 
(+) Frequency of political 
cronism and other not economic 
  (-)Bank typically influences 
new laws and regulations* 
(f)  
                                                 
7 Synthetic index summing up three indicators: low firm profitability and liquidity, management quality and lack of adequate collateral  
8 Synthetic index summing up three indicators: effectiveness of banking regulations, independence of judiciary from political influences and protection of contractual and property 
rights in business disputes William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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reasons in credit approval* (е) 
Y5 
 





(+) Bank’s strategy is its clients to 
use other banks’ services as well** 
(c)  
(-) Bank strategy is to provide full-
scale service for its clients
9** 
  (+) Readiness to provide credits 
to state firms*** (f) 
(+) Readiness to provide credits 
to foreign firms* (f)  
(-) Readiness to provide credits 
to Bulgarian firms* (f)  
(-) Firms prefer long-term 
relations with a single bank* (c)  
(+) Firms prefer banking 
relations with more than one 
bank* (c)  
(-) Index
10 of firms preferences 
for commitment to a single bank 
services** 
(+) The bank system will be 
destabilized if banks are allowed 
to have shares in firms** (c)  
  
***   Significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
**   Significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
 
(а) Values from 1 (not decisive factor) to 5 (decisive factor)          (e) Values from 1 (very frequent) to 5 (never) 
(b) Values from 0 (no such rules) and 1 (low efficiency) to 5 (high efficiency)     (f) Values from 1 (never) до 5 (very frequent) 
(c) Values from 1 (not true) to 5 (true)            (g) Values: Foreign owner – 1, domestic owner – 0 
(d) Values from 1 (very strong obstacles) to 5 (no obstacles) 
                                                 
9 Index is based on answers of two questions (value of first minus value of second): first, The bank is aimed at maintaining relations with firms where the bank is the major financial service provider and 
second, the Bank is aimed at maintain relations with firms, where its clients use services of other banks. Values are as in (c). 
10 Index is based on answers of two questions (value of first minus value of second): first, firms prefer single bank services and second, firms prefer being serviced by more than one bank. Values are as 
in (c).   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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Table 5. Credit supply (regressions) 
Y/L
S    Firms credits  
as a share of total credit  
Credits  
as a share of total assets 
Private credits 
 
Private credits as a 
share of total assets 
Private credits as a 
share of total assets 
Public credits 
 
Y1 Bank  lending 
capacity 
[(-0.381), (-2.418)]**  [(-0.509),  (-4.80)]***  [(0.853), (8.793)]***  [(-0.508), (-4.524)]***  [( -0.509), (-4.659)]*** 
 
 
 Low  quality
11 of 
proposed firm 
projects was a 
decisive factor 




    [(  -0.166),  (-1.200)]   













  [( -1.122), (-7.076)]***  [(-.372), (-3.408)]***  [(-1.139), (-7.278)]***  [(-6.510), (-6.510)]***   
Y3 
 











  [( 0.524), (2.759)]**    [(0.278), (1.830)]    [(0.365), (2.216)]*   









  [( 0.250), (1.474)]            
 Majority  owner 
share  
   [(-.068),  (-0.567)]     
                                                 
11 Synthetic index summing up three indicators: low firm profitability and liquidity, management quality and lack of adequate collateral  
12 Synthetic index summing up three indicators: effectiveness of banking regulations, independence of judiciary from political influences and protection of contractual and property rights in business 




Bank strategy is 
to provide full-
scale service for 
its clients 
[(-.526),  (-3.641)]***        
 Index
13 of firms 
preferences for 
commitment to a 
single bank 
services 
      [(-0.512),(-2.817)]** 
  R  square  .883  0.951 0.927  0.911 0.926 0.636 
 Adjusted  R 
square 
.844  0.893 0.905  0.877 0.884 0.570 
  Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
9.7949  4.935E-02 21993.4173  5.432E-02 5.288E-02 7620.3394 
  ANOVA  F  22.682 16.300 42.320  27.242 21.917 9.606 
 
                                                 
13 Index is based on answers of two questions (value of first minus value of second): first, firms prefer single bank services and second, firms prefer being serviced by more than one bank. Values are as 
in (c). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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 As far as the bank ownership structure is concerned, the more concentrated the ownership is and 
the share of the major owner, the more credit is lent. The significance of firm ownership and the role of 
the link “banks-firms” at credit lending are more difficult to interpret. As a whole, the close relations 
between banks and firms affects “adversely” credit decision-making, and the evaluations of banks show 
that this could have a destabilizing effect. This result could be seen as a reaction to the former system of 
crediting (before the CB), when inside and directed lending occupied the whole system. This result is also 
an additional consequence of the phenomenon, observed at credit demand, of separating the activity of the 
bank sector from the real sector in Bulgaria.  
 
VI. Conclusion and Discussion 
 
In this article, we have tried to: (i) overcome the restrictions of traditional credit models, 
conceiving it in a broad institutional environment (including the currency board) and the context of the 
specificity of the transition (corruption, the change of ownership rights), (ii) analyze credit as focusing in 
itself the whole range of bank-firm relationships. In the model, we have tried to “intersect” the factors of 
credit both on the part of supply (banks) and on the part of demand (firms), and finally, (iii) on the basis 
of a unique empirical database and questionnaires we have tested the empirically presented hypotheses. 
  The results of the study lead to several general conclusions. 
  First, the study confirmed our conception that credit could not be seen in the framework of the 
traditional “mechanistic” models, especially in the context of transitional economies. The “resource” 
factors do not have significant influence on the credit dynamics and structure and become secondary, 
whereas the features of the institutional environment become primary. 
  Second, in 1998-2001 in Bulgaria, there is separation of the activity of the financial sector, the 
bank system, from the activity of the real sector. Lending bank credits to the enterprise sector during this 
period is not related to: (i) bank sector resources; (ii) activity, profitability, and financial health of 
enterprises; (iii) close bank-firm relations in board of directors structures.  
Third, in the new conditions of the CB after 1997, the existence of the dual enterprise sector and 
the specific institutional environment continues. Bank credits are statistically significantly higher with 
private strategic investors, but they are such with  ‘crony’ firms and firms with offshore owners as well. 
On the side of credit supply by banks, the corruption environment is a halting factor, but on the side of the 
credit demand by firms, ‘crony’ firms have an advantage over independent firms.  
Four, in spite of the observed separation, the CB could not be viewed as an obstacle to credit, but 
rather as a simplified and stable framework which places the firm-bank relations on a new “healthy” 
foundation. For example, in the regime of the CB, banks become more cautious, they build serious William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
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systems of credit project selection and demand good credit practices. The supposition that banks prefer to 
lend credits to the private sector is confirmed. In spite of the disciplining role of the CB, it, by itself, is not 
sufficient to overcome the other “institutional” barriers, connected with the inefficiency of the legal 
system, corruption, state capture, the insecurity of property rights, etc. It is difficult to claim that the CB 
could dramatically decrease corruption, it could only change its forms. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
  23
References   
Agenor, P., J. Aizeman and A. Hoffmaister (2000). The Credit Crunch in East Asia: What Can 
Bank Excess Liquid Assets Tell Us?, NBER WP 7951. 
 
  Barajas, A., and R. Steiner (2001). Credit Stagnation in Latin America, IMF WP, November. 
 
Berlemann, M., K. Hristov and N. Nenovsky (2002). Lending of last resort, moral hazard and 
twin crises. Lessons from the Bulgarian financial crises 1996/1997, William Davidson Institute Working 
Paper N 464, 65 p. 
 
Berglof, E., G. Roland (1998). Soft Budget Constraints and Credit Crunches in Financial 
transition, European Economic Review, 41, pp. 807-17.  
 
Braun, M., E. Levy-Yeyati (2000).  The Role of Banks in Transmission of shocks: micro 
Evidence from Argentina 1996-1999, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. 
 
  Calza, A., Gartner, C., and J. Sousa, Modelling the demand for loans to the private sector in the 
euro area, ECB WP, No. 55, April 2001. 
 
Canonero, G. (1997). Bank concentration and the supply of credit in Argentina, IMF WP/97/40. 
 
Caporale, G., J. Miller, K. Hristov, N. Nenovsky, B. Petrov (2001), The Banking System in 
Bulgaria, in “Banking Reforms in South-East Europe”, ed. Z. Sevic, Edward Elgar. 
 
Catao, L. (1997). Bank credit in Argentina in the aftermath of the Mexican crisis: Supply or 
Demand Constrained?, IMF WP/97/32. 
 
De Haan, L. (2001). The credit channel in the Netherlands: evidence from bank balance sheet, 
European central Bank, WP No. 98. 
 
Dewatripont, M., E. Maskin (1995). Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and decentralized 
Economies, Review of Economic Studies, 62, pp. 541-556. 
 
Dobrinsky, R., Nikolov, B., and N. Markov, “Micro budget constrains in Bulgaria under the 
currency board arrangement, 2002, PHARE ACE Project P98-1125R. 
 
EBRD, Strategy for Bulgaria, December 2001. 
 
Everaert, G., and A. Hildebrandt (2001) On the causes of soft budget constraints: firm – level 
evidence from Bulgaria and Romania, LICOS Discussion Paper 109. 
 
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, G., and B. Petersen, Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment, 
Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1988, (1), pp. 141-95. 
 
Fair, R and D. Jafee (1972). Methods of estimation for markets in disequilibrium, Econometrica, 
Vol.40, No 3. 
 
Feyzioglu, T., G.Gelos (2001). Why is private sector credit so low in Bulgaria?, in IMF report for 
Bulgaria, pp. 64-90. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
  24
Ghosh, A., S. Ghosh (1999). East Asia in Aftermath: Was There a Crunch?, IMF WP 99/38. 
 
Gourinchas, P., R. Valdes, O. Landerretche (2001). Lending Booms: Latin America and the 
World, NBER WP 8249. 
 
Gugler, K., D. C. Mueller, and B. Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance, Capital Market Discipline 
and the Returns on Investment, mimeo, 2002. 
 
Hellman, J., Jones, G., Kaufmann, D., and M. Schankerman (2000), Measuring Governance, 
Corruption, and State Capture. How Firms and Bureaucrats Shape the Business Environment in 
Transition Economies, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2312, Washington DC, The 
World Bank. 
 
Hernando, I., and J. Martinez-Pages (2001). Is the there bank lending channel of monetary policy 
in Spain, European Central Bank, Working Papers, No. 99. 
 
Li, D. (1992). Public ownership as a sufficient condition for the Soft budget constraint, CREST  
WP 93-07. 
 
Laffont, J-J., and R. Garcia (1977). Disequilibrium econometrics for business loans, 
Econometrica, vol. 45,issue 5, pp.1187-1204 
 
Loupias, C., Savignac, F., and P. Sevestre (2001). Monetary policy and bank lending in 
France:Are there asymmetries?, European Central Bank, working papers, No. 101. 
 
Kaufman, S. (2001). Asymmetries in bank lending behaviour. Austria during the 1990s, European 
central bank, working paper, No 97. 
 
Koford, K., A. Tschogl (2000). Problems of bank lending in Bulgaria: informational asymmetry 
and institutional learning. MOCT/MOST 9, 13-151 
 
McAdam, P., and J. Morgan (2001). The monetary transmission mechanism at the euro - area 
level: issues and results using structural macroeconomic models, European Central Bank, working papers 
No.93 
 
Maskin, Eric and Chenggang Xu (2001). Soft budget constraint theories. From centralization to 
the market; in: Economics of Transition, vol. 9, No. 1, pp.1-27. 
 
Miller, J., S. Petranov (2001): The Financial System in the Bulgarian Economy, BNB Discussion 
Papers, DP/12/02. 
 
Mojon, B., and G. Peersman (2001). A Var description of the effects of monetary policy in the 
individual countries of the euro area, European Central Bank, working paper No 92. 
   
    Nenovsky, N. and Y. Rizopoulos (2003). Extreme Monetary Regime Change. Evidence from 
Currency Board Introduction in Bulgaria, Journal of Economic Issues, forthcoming. 
   
    Nenovsky, N. and K. Hristov (1998). Financial repression and credit rationing under the Currency 
board arrangement for Bulgaria, BNB Discussions Papers, 2 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 555 
  25
Nenovsky, N. and K. Hristov (2002). New Currency Boards and Discretion. The Empirical 
Evidence from Bulgaria, Economic Systems, March Issue, vol.26. no 1, pp. 55-72.  
 
Nenovsky, N., K. Hristov, M. Mihaylov (2001). Comparing Currency Board Automatic 
Mechanism in Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania, Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, 2001, 
vol. XI, n 4, pp. 575 – 616. 
 
OECD, (1999), Economic Survey of Bulgaria. 
 
Peersman, G., and F. Smets, The monetary transmission mechanism in the euro area: more 
evidence from var analysis, European Central bank, working papers, No 91, 2001 
 
Peev, E., (ed.), Separation of Ownership from Control in Southeast Europe: A Comparison of 
Bulgaria, Romania and Albania 1990-96, Kota, Sofia, 1999. 
 
Pissarides, F., Singer, M., and J. Svejnar (2000). Objectives and constraints of entrepreneurs: 
Evidence from small and medium- sized enterprises in Russia and Bulgaria, EBRD, working paper 
No.59. 
 
Pazarbasioglu, C. (1997), A credit crunch? Finland in the Aftermath of the Banking crisis, IMF 
Staff Papers, vol.44, No3. 
 
Topi, J., and J. Vilmunen (2001). Transmission of monetary policy shocks in Finland: evidence 
from bank level data on loans, ECB WP, No. 100. 
 
Vahabi, M. (2001). The Soft Budget Constraint: A Theoretical Clarification, Recherches 
Economique de Louvain, n 2., pp. 157 – 195. 
 
Valderama, M. (2002). Credit channel and investment behaviour in Austria: a micro-econometric 
approach, ONB WP paper, No58. 
 
Vutcheva, H. (2001). Ikonomicheskata politika v Balgaria prez perioda 1991-2000 (Economic 
Policy in Bulgaria during 1991 – 2000). Sofia: UNSS Edition. 
 
Worms, A. (2001). Monetary policy effects on bank loans in Germany: a panel- econometric 
analysis, ECB Discussion paper No. 96  
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF 4/04/03 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 555: Banks-Firms Nexus under the Currency Board: Empirical 
Evidence from Bulgaria 
Nikolay Nenovsky, Evgeni Peev 
and Todor Yalamov 
Apr. 2003 
No. 554: To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, 
and Valuation 
Art Durnev and E. Han Kim  Apr. 2003 
No. 553: Corporate Stability and Economic Growth  Kathy S. He, Randall Morck and 
Bernard Yeung 
Apr. 2003 
No. 552: So Many Rocket Scientists, So Few Marketing Clerks: 
Occupational Mobility in Times of Rapid Technological Change 
Nauro F. Campos and Aurelijus 
Dabušinskas 
Mar. 2003 
No. 551: Determinants of Interregional Mobility in Russia: Evidence 
from Panel Data 
Yuri Andrienko and Sergei 
Guriev 
Feb. 2003 
No. 550: Gross Job Flows in Ukraine: Size, Ownership and Trade 
Effects 
Jozef Konings, Olga Kupets and 
Hartmut Lehmann 
Mar. 2003 
No. 549: Technology Transfer through FDI in Top-10 Transition 
Countries: How Important are Direct Effects, Horizontal and Vertical 
Spillovers? 
Jože P. Damijan, Mark Knell, 
Boris Majcen and Matija Rojec 
Feb. 2003 
No. 548: Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of 
Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages 
Beata K. Smarzynska  Mar. 2003 
No. 547: Re-employment Probabilities and Wage Offer Function for 
Russian Labor Market 
Natalia V. Smirnova  Feb. 2003 
No. 546: Democratization’s Risk Premium: Partisan and Opportunistic 
Political Business Cycle Effects on Sovereign Ratings in Developing 
Countries 
Steven Block, Burkhard N. 
Schrage and Paul M. Vaaler 
Feb. 2003 
No. 545: Structural Reforms and Competitiveness: Will Europe 
Overtake America? 
Jan Svejnar  Feb. 2003 
No. 544: Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights  Konstantin Sonin  Dec. 2002 
No. 543: Reinvested Earnings Bias, The “Five Percent” Rule and the 
Interpretation of the Balance of Payments  –  With an Application to 
Transition Economies 
Josef C. Brada and Vladimír 
Tomšík 
Feb. 2003 
No. 542: The Impact of Ownership Reform in Chinese Industry, 1995-
2001 
Gary H. Jefferson, Su Jian, Jiang 
Yuan and Yu Xinhua 
Feb. 2003 
No. 541: Defensive and Strategic Restructuring of Firms during the 
Transition to a Market Economy 
Domadenik, Janez Prašnikar and 
Jan Svejnar 
Feb. 2003 
No. 540: Tenuous Financial Stability  Neven T. Valev and John A. 
Carlson 
Feb. 2003 
No. 539: Non-monetary Trade and Differential Access to Credit in the 
Russian Transition 
Vlad Ivanenko  Feb. 2003 
No. 538: International Price-Fixing Cartels and Developing Countries: 
A Discussion of Effects and Policy Remedies 
Margaret Levenstein and Valerie 
Suslow with Lynda Oswald 
Feb. 2003 
No. 537: Foreign Banks in Bulgaria, 1875-2002  Kenneth Koford and Adrian E. 
Tschoegl 
Jan. 2003 
No. 536: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Healthy Organizations and the Link to Peaceful Societies: Strategies 
for Implementing Organizational Change” 
Jeannette Jackson and Maria 
Coolican 
Jan. 2003 
No. 535: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Workplace Violence and Security: Are there Lessons for 
Peacemaking?” 
Frances E. Zollers and Elletta 
Sangrey Callahan 
Jan. 2003 
No. 534: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“700 Families to Feed: The Challenge of Corporate Citizenship” 
Tara J. Radin  Jan. 2003 
No. 533: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Governing for Genuine Profit” 
Michael J. O'Hara  Jan. 2003 
No. 532: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Adapting Corporate Governance for Sustainable Peace” 
Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. 
Schipani 
Jan. 2003 
No. 531: Forthcoming in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
“Groundings of Voice in Employee Rights” 
Dana Muir  Jan. 2003 
 